

THE KARGIL CONFLICT: BREAKDOWN OF NEGOTIATIONS IN SOUTH ASIA

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Introduction

The south Asian region (consisting of Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and Pakistan) has seen numerous conflicts since the end of World War II. Collectively known as the Indian Subcontinent¹, the British separated the area into two autonomous nations² in 1947. Since that time, the two countries have fought a series of bitter conflicts, one of which resulted in the separation of East Pakistan into (what is now known as) Bangladesh. The purpose of this paper is to outline the nature of the Kargil conflict, provide its background and history, and to analyze the negotiations between Pakistan and India (leading up to the conflict) in order to disseminate the causes for the war. In this way, we can show the failing of bilateral negotiations between the two, and propose recommendations for the future in order to normalize relations between the two countries. We propose a conflict model based on Game Theory to explain the conflicts and the results of the negotiations, and analyze the negotiations using Organization Theory in order to shed light on the outcomes. Since this is primarily a bilateral negotiation, the Game Theory model will be simple in its construct, though we will show how actors outside of the Indian subcontinent influenced the outcomes of the conflict as well as the negotiations themselves. Secondly, we propose to analyze the negotiations using Organization Theory. This is relevant to our analysis because while the culture of the two nations is essentially the same, the structure and processes involved in the negotiations themselves are not. Primarily due to ideological differences and political volatility amongst the two, we will show how these factors impeded progress in the nations' arriving at a negotiated settlement.

The structure for the rest of the paper is as follows. The next section will give a brief overview of the background of the two nations, as well as recount key military conflicts between

¹ Under British Colonial rule

² Namely the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

the two. While there is an incredible amount of literature addressing the history of the conflict between India and Pakistan, we will attempt to outline the salient points for the negotiations rather than describe the conflict in its entirety. The third section will outline the key negotiated agreements between the two nations. The fourth section will outline the interests of the two nations and the main issue over which the conflict has taken place. Here, we will attempt to disseminate the various bargaining points of the two nations, using the Kashmir issue as the main backdrop, but also outlining proximal issues as well. The fifth section will then outline the game-theoretical model used in this analysis, providing a rationale for the payoffs for the two nations, and attempting to explain why reconciliation has not been reached so far. Particular emphasis will be given to the Kargil war in 1999. The sixth section will outline Organizational theory, and will compare and contrast the structural effects of the two nations to show why no settlement has been reached. The last section will conclude the paper, suggest certain shifts in stances for the two nations in order to break through the barriers, and will forecast outcomes for future negotiations based on the current situation.

Background to and Conflicts between India and Pakistan

In the aftermath of World War II, the British Empire had begun to disintegrate, mainly due to the heavy losses it undertook because of the war, along with international and domestic pressures (in the colonies) for independence. They (the British) began to hand back the colonies to the people. It was at this time that the founder of Pakistan, Muhammed Ali Jinnah, requested a nation independent of India due to the conflicts that may arise between the two majority religious sects in India (namely the Hindu's and the Muslim's). He demanded a separate homeland for the

Muslim's, under his infamous "Two-Nation Theory"³. While this was strongly opposed by Indian leaders such as Gandhi and Nehru, the British accepted Jinnah's proposal, and thus the nations of Pakistan and India were formed as the Indian subcontinent split into two.

The partition of British India was designed in the following manner. The subcontinent was made of 565 states that were officially ruled by Indian figureheads. According to the rules of partition, each prince had a choice of joining either India or Pakistan. This posed little problem for the majority of the states, since both the leader and the majority of the population was either Hindu or Muslim. There were three cases, however, where there was either a Muslim majority with a Hindu leader, or vice versa. These were the states of Junagadh, Hyderabad, and Kashmir. For these three states, the leaders underwent significant pressure in deciding which country to accede to, and initially wanted independence. Hyderabad and Junagadh were both surrounded by states that had already acceded to India, and thus after some strife, eventually joined India. Kashmir turned out to be a much bigger issue that really formed the basis of future conflicts between the two sovereign nations⁴.

The underlying problem is said to be essentially a misunderstanding between the two countries. To begin with, Kashmir is a beautiful area, quite mountainous, and enjoyed a large amount of tourist activity during British rule. It is also very geographically desirable, since it shares a border with China, and is the region where the five main rivers that flow through the subcontinent originate. This is an important factor given the strong agricultural economy of Pakistan and India (at the time)⁵. Thus, whoever controlled the water source had a considerable advantage. Secondly, the prince of the state of Kashmir (also called Jammu and Kashmir) was

³ Actually, the "Two-Nation Theory" is originally attributed to Allama Iqbal, an Indian poet/philosopher. Jinnah simply translated Iqbal's work into political doctrine.

⁴ See Khan (2005); pgs 44-46

⁵ This resulted in the Indus Waters Treaty between Pakistan and India in 1960 to circumvent any further violence based on India's ability to control the water flow through Pakistan.

Hindu, though the majority of the population was Muslim. Therefore, due to internal pressures, the prince wanted independence at first, but later aligned with India. However, since this state bordered with other states that had acceded to Pakistan, the Pakistani's felt that Kashmir rightly belonged to them, especially since the situation was reversed with Junagadh and Hyderabad. Once Independence was finally achieved in the subcontinent (in 1947), the leader of Kashmir had not officially declared the country he acceded to, and thus, given the Muslim majority, the lack of official declaration, and the case of Junagadh and Hyderabad, Pakistani assumed Kashmir to be a part of their nation. Come October 1947, however, the Kashmiri leader announced their alignment with India, at which point India claimed its right on the state. Immediately after that, Pakistani militants invaded the Kashmir area in order to ensure Pakistan's unofficial control over Kashmir. India retaliated with their military forces, which sparked the War of 1947-48 between the two countries⁶. The war ended with the United Nations intervening and arranging a ceasefire and cessation of hostilities in order to find a negotiated solution to the dispute. At this point, it is important to note that the US favored the Pakistani position on the Kashmir issue.

The 1947-48 War was to be the first of many conflicts on the bitterly disputed Kashmir issue, between India and Pakistan. In 1965, Pakistan started a covert military operation in Kashmir that sparked off another war. In Pakistani texts though, the infiltration into Indian territory in the Kashmir province is attributed to Kashmiri freedom fighters⁷, which shows just how differently each nation views the conflict. At this point, General Ayub Khan had control over the nation, fighting and winning two elections (though the elections have allegations of being rigged in his favor). He had taken over the Pakistani Government in 1958 and placed

⁶ For a concise summary of the war, please see:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/static/in_depth/south_asia/2002/india_pakistan/timeline/1947_48.stm

⁷ See Khan (2005); pg 178

Pakistan in its first round of martial law. The War ended after the Pakistani president and the Indian prime minister met in Tashkent (the meeting was sponsored by the Soviet Union)⁸.

The next war was to occur in 1971 following a civil war in Pakistan. East Pakistan wanted their independence from the West, and because of the massive amount of East Pakistani refugee's in India, the Indian military attacked the region and forced a Pakistani surrender at Dhaka. This led to the formation of Bangladesh as an independent state. Pakistan was still under a form of military rule under General Yahya Khan⁹. The next incident took place in 1989 when armed militants fought with the Indian military. While there was no direct fighting this time, Pakistan was accused to providing weapons to the militants, making this an indirect conflict. Interestingly, this conflict took place right after Pakistan conducted general elections in 1988, leading to the democratically elected government of Benazir Bhutto. In 1998, both Pakistan and India conducted nuclear tests, becoming the two latest nations to join the nuclear-armed nations of the world. Suddenly, the stakes were raised for any subsequent conflict between the two archrivals, and the threat of nuclear war seemed imminent. Sanctions were placed on both nations to coerce the governments to give up their nuclear weapons programs, but to no avail. Neither nation backed down¹⁰.

Finally, in 1999, the Kargil conflict took place. This was an especially dangerous conflict since it took place between two nations that were bitterly opposed to one another, and now possessed the power to cause a nuclear holocaust in the region. The fighting began with the Pakistani Military crossing the Line of Control (LoC) in the Kargil district of Kashmir.

According to Dixit (2002), the main reasons for Pakistani aggression in the region were:

⁸ See Khan (2005); Chap. 15

⁹ General elections were held in 1970, but the candidate from East Pakistan (Mujib) won, and clearly wanted to secure the future for Bangladesh, rather than for the whole of Pakistan, thus leading to a revolt led by Yahya himself. See Khan (2005); Chap. 19

¹⁰ See Khan (2005); Chap. 35

- Given the nuclear capability of Pakistan, risk of a full-scale war was limited.
- It would send the international community a message signaling Pakistani intent and seriousness of the Kashmir issue.
- Pakistan expected support from China due to their having similar border disputes with India.
- Pakistani military was more skilled at high altitude warfare.
- Pakistan had the support of insurgents in the Indian territory.
- Indian outposts in Kargil had a strategic geographical advantage.
- The surprise attack would not be expected because it came on the heels of a negotiated agreement¹¹.

The conflict lasted over 50 days, with Pakistan gaining considerable territory in Kargil, but eventually losing it back to the Indians. Furthermore, due to diplomatic pressures from other nations, Pakistan was forced to cease hostilities and move their troops back to the original territories. This was the last major conflict between the two nations.

Agreements between India and Pakistan¹²

There have been numerous agreements between India and Pakistan; however, not a single one has been able to resolve the Kashmir issue. Starting with the agreement that led to a cessation of hostilities for the first war (1947-48), the United Nations Security Council intervened to curb hostilities in 1948. An independent commission was set up by the UN to oversee the issue. This was known as the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP), which declared that a ceasefire was to take place with the withdrawal of all Pakistani troops from Kashmir and a

¹¹ This agreement is known as the Lahore Declaration. Further discussion on this and similar agreements will be conducted in the next section.

¹² Information for this section comes from various chapters of Khan (2005) and appendix I of Wirsing (1994)

majority vote (plebiscite) to take place in the state to determine Kashmir's future. Pakistan retained a small share of the state.

Secondly, the Indus Waters Treaty was signed by the two nations in 1960, to ensure that the rivers that flowed through the nations would not be tampered with by either India or Pakistan. Since the Indus Rivers originated from Indian territory, this was more of an agreement on India's part, not to threaten Pakistan's economy due to the Kashmir dispute. The World Bank orchestrated this particular agreement. The next major agreement came in 1966 in the aftermath of the second war (1965). This was known as the Tashkent agreement, orchestrated by the Soviet Union. Again, the main issue of Kashmir's fate was sidelined in an effort to stop the war. India and Pakistan agreed to move back to their occupied territories before the war, economic, diplomatic relations would be restored, and all efforts would be made to resolve the Kashmir issue.

The Simla agreement was signed in 1972 following the third war between the two nations (1971). The object of this treaty was to end the war by declaring Bangladesh as an autonomous nation and in return, India would release their prisoners of war, without charging anyone of war crimes. In addition, the treaty called for greater efforts on the part of both India and Pakistan to solve the Kashmir issue (again) and established the first official LoC in the Kashmir region. Finally, the controversial Lahore Declaration was signed in February 1999 (just 3 months before the Kargil conflict). The agreements were as follows:

Pakistan and India:

- *“shall intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir.”*
- *“shall refrain from intervention and interference in each other's internal affairs.”*

- *“shall intensify their composite and integrated dialogue process for an early and positive outcome of the agreed bilateral agenda.”*
- *“shall take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons and discuss concepts and doctrines with a view to elaborating measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at prevention of conflict.”*
- *“reaffirm their commitment to the goals and objectives of SAARC and to concert their efforts towards the realisation of the SAARC vision for the year 2000 and beyond with a view to promoting the welfare of the peoples of South Asia and to improve their quality of life through accelerated economic growth, social progress and cultural development.”*
- *“reaffirm their condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and their determination to combat this menace.”*
- *“shall promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.”¹³*

It is not difficult to notice (from this agreement) that by starting the Kargil conflict, Pakistan completely went against the points outlined by this accord. One final point of interest is that there was one more high level meeting that took place in 2001, called the Agra Summit. Given the failure of Pakistan to live up to the Lahore Declaration, it should come as no surprise that the Summit was a failure, with both Pakistan and India finally coming to the agreement that the Kashmir issue is at the basis of the conflict and that both parties are completely inflexible in resolving the conflict. Hence, they outlined the fact that their respective BATNA's are indeed the status quo situation of Kashmir in perpetual turmoil.

¹³ Retrieved from the United States Institute for Peace: http://www.usip.org/library/pa/ip/ip_lahore19990221.html on 4-25-2007

Interests, Issues, and Bargaining Points

Over time, the periphery issues for both India and Pakistan have changed, but the core issue has always remained the same; i.e. Kashmir. A few developments over the years have significantly changed the way both countries perceive the problem at hand, but the initial problem remains the same. Both India and Pakistan want the entire Kashmir region to become a part of their respective nations. Furthermore, this problem has remained with the two nations for so long; it is indeed difficult to see how any one nation can acquiesce on this without facing significant domestic political costs. However, the key turning points (as outlined above) have been the war of 1947-48 (which established the positions of both nations), Indus river issue in 1960, Pakistani civil war and the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, nuclear capabilities in 1998, and finally, the Lahore Declaration and the Kargil war in 1999. Each of these events changed the payoffs of resolution for both nations, although we reserve further discussion on this score for the next section. Below we will establish the initial positions for each nation, and show how those change over time during these key events.

Starting with 1947, Pakistan did not accept the accession of Kashmir to India, and thus the region was free to choose whichever country it wanted to join with. India, on the other hand, accepted the accession of the prince, and saw the discomfort of the Kashmiri people as a domestic issue, to be resolved between them (India) and Kashmir. Secondly, Pakistan noted that the role of the UN should be to hold an independent plebiscite (with the UN as acting government in the region), whereas India wanted the existing Kashmiri government to make the choice of alignment. In addition, Pakistan wanted a stop to the fighting, only under the conditions of the plebiscite, whereas India wanted an immediate ceasefire. Third, Pakistan wanted a mutual withdrawal of troops and tribesmen, whereas India wanted the withdrawal of

only the Pakistani forces¹⁴. In many ways, this is similar to the negotiations between the US and North Korea, in that Pakistan is playing more of the North Korean role, even though it is faced with a stronger power. This hardened stance of both nations did not help proceedings, though they did come to an agreement once the UN proposed to take the matter up entirely by setting up the UNCIP. Next, the UN proposed that India and Pakistan both agree to an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal of Pakistani tribesmen and military in exchange for India's withdrawal of as many troops as possible in order to have some law and order keeping troops within Kashmir, the state government fairly represented the population, and a plebiscite is conducted and overseen by the UNCIP. The outcome was in Pakistan's favor and to India's disadvantage, but they (India and Pakistan) did not comply. The outcome was that India controlled two-thirds of Kashmir, whereas Pakistan controlled the remainder.

Turning to the Indus Waters Treaty, this issue was a significant one in the history of the conflict, even though it did not amount to war. When India rerouted some of the rivers and unveiled plans to build a dam, they created tensions between the two nations¹⁵. It gave the Pakistani's a sense of urgency in resolving this issue, but unfortunately resolving it in Pakistan's favor. The reasoning behind this assumption is that the area through which the Indus runs and comes into Pakistan is in Indian-administered Kashmir. Since agriculture was the main portion of the economy, the threat of having their life-supply cut off would have really resonated with Pakistan. The literature does not address whether this move was a coercive tactic to make Pakistan relent on the Kashmir issue, but if indeed it was, it had the effect of incensing Pakistan rather than submitting to the pressure. Sidharan (2005) states that "[Indus Waters Treaty] came about and has lasted despite wars because, in our framework, it did not threaten relative gains to

¹⁴ See Gupta; pgs. 156-59

¹⁵ See Wirsing (1994); pg. 268

either state in a form that could be translated into military gains”¹⁶, which explains why it has persisted despite future conflicts. With the help of the World Bank, they framed the Indus Waters Treaty with India, but given the nature of their relationship, they would have perceived the treaty to be weak at best, and completely unreliable at worst. This development sets the stage for the war of 1965.

In our view, the threat that brought about the Indus Waters Treaty created a previously unperceived threat to the Pakistani people. This would explain Pakistani aggression in 1965, displaying renewed impetus to capture Indian-Kashmiri territory. This time, however, the Soviet Union exerted its influence to force a negotiated settlement between the warring nations, in Tashkent. This short-lived war would have had the effect of signaling the Pakistani intent towards the Indians, making them more cautious in return. That being said, however, the Pakistani civil war in 1971 and the subsequent intervention (on behalf of the Bangladeshi's) by India would have raised the stakes even higher. The agreement that came at the end of this war was the strongest one yet, since both India and Pakistan had new bargaining options. Since India defeated Pakistan, they held prisoners of war, who they planned to try for war crimes. Because of this renewed bargaining position, India was able to coerce Pakistan into agreeing to a LoC in the Kashmir region (solving the Kashmir issue itself being a non-option), as well as agreeing to a permanent ceasefire and to have bilateral negotiations in the future. This led to the longest era of peace between the two nations (barring the 1988 incident that soured relations but did not result in war).

Finally, the nuclear capabilities of both countries again shaped the nature of the negotiations. This is a particularly important development because now the archrivals had nuclear capabilities, hence the world began to take notice and was conscientious of how close the

¹⁶ See Sidharan (2005); pgs. 333-34

threat of nuclear war became. Due to renewed pressure of international economic sanctions, both nations agreed to the Lahore Declaration, which was the strongest agreement yet, and was hailed as a great success. Just three months later, the entire progress made so far, broke down, as Pakistan planned and carried out a covert attack in the Kargil region of Kashmir. How was it that such an important landmark agreement broke down so quickly? In the following sections, we will attempt to explain this outcome using our two theoretical approaches.

The Game-Theoretic Model(s)

First, we turn to game theory in order to analyze the payoffs and the outcomes for each of the above-mentioned events. According to Brams et al (1994), we would have to choose noncooperative game theory, because we are discussing a state of conflict between India and Pakistan. Game theory is an excellent method to apply in our case because of its simplicity, as well as the fact that this is primarily a bilateral negotiation. As other players influence the outcomes, their respective influence would be shown in the payoffs rather than a stand-alone game tree, which would make things less complex. The game tree is useful if we are trying to determine what the third party's decision would be, however, in this case we know exactly what the third party is choosing. The third party usually remains independent in all cases, because of the danger of war escalation, especially given that India and Pakistan attained nuclear capability.

The overarching model that we would start with is whether the two players (India and Pakistan) choose to keep Kashmir or surrender their territory. However, we know that for this specific case, surrendering is not an option. Both nations claim the Kashmir territory and, given the history of the conflict, neither one is backing down. Therefore, we would change model one's choice set to be between "Status Quo" (SQ) and "Attack" (ATT). Thus, throughout this

discussion, this overarching model is being calibrated via these two options. Note that for each event discussed in the previous sections, they payoffs for each player change, and thus we would analyze the Nash Equilibrium (in bold) for each to explain the outcome.

		Pakistan	
		Status Quo	Attack
India	Status Quo	-2,-2	-3,0
	Attack	0,-3	-1,-1

Figure 1: Model 1947 War

Figure one shows the equilibrium in the first round of the game (the 1947 war)¹⁷. The payoffs are negative to all parties simply due to the costs of war; however, the payoff is 0 for the aggressor and -3 for the one choosing SQ, simply because in this case, if Pakistan is the aggressor, but India chooses Status Quo, then the attacker has the advantage. Recall that surrendering is not an option, so regardless of whom the attacker is; the nations will still fight unless they both chose SQ (which would imply an agreement of some sort). In this first iteration, both nations claim the territory, and thus they both attack and war ensues.

		Pakistan	
		Status Quo	Attack
India	Status Quo	1,1	-3,0
	Attack	0,-3	-1,-1

Figure 2: Model 1948 War with UN Intervention

Figure 2 shows the outcomes of the 1947 war once the UN intervened. Through negotiations and dialogues between the leaders of the two nations, the UN was able to come to an agreement that altered the payoff structure for India and Pakistan. For the reasons outlined in section III, the UN was able to coerce both nations into accepting a ceasefire. This is an example of third party intervention that alters the outcome. In this round, both Pakistan and India reluctantly signed a peace accord and ceased hostilities.

¹⁷ The left payoff is India's whereas the right payoff's are Pakistan's.

		Pakistan	
		Status Quo	Attack
India	Status Quo	1,0	-1,-3
	Attack	-1,-4	-1,-5

Figure 3: Model 1960 Indus Waters Treaty

In the third round, we turn to 1960, where the Indus Waters Treaty came into effect. Here, the equilibrium for both players is at SQ, but notice how the payoffs have changed for the players. This is because since India controls Pakistan's water supply, the payoff to attacking have significantly decreased. India chooses not to attack because it already has Pakistan at a disadvantage, at as presumed earlier; India used this tactic to get Pakistan to make some concessions. Thus, the payoff to attacking for India is slightly lower than maintaining SQ.

		Pakistan	
		Status Quo	Attack
India	Status Quo	0,-2	-6,0
	Attack	-2,-3	-8,-1

Figure 4: Model 1965 War

In the fourth round, we model the 1965 war, where Pakistan attacks India. As outlined in section IV, Pakistan perceived India's actions (prior to the Indus Waters Treaty) as a threat. Thus, the payoffs have altered in this game to show that Pakistan attacks first, using the element of surprise. India did not expect an attack after the Treaty, so its payoffs are lower in each cell¹⁸.

		Pakistan	
		Status Quo	Attack
India	Status Quo	1,1	-6,0
	Attack	-2,-3	-8,-1

Figure 5: Model 1966 Tashkent Agreement

In the fifth round, we see another intervention, this time by the USSR. Again the interpretation is the same, through multilateral negotiations, the Soviet Union was able to alter the payoffs for both nations such that choosing an agreement becomes the equilibrium. All other

¹⁸ Notice that the magnitude of the payoffs is getting lower, denoting the element of surprise. The payoffs continue to lower throughout the game.

payoffs remain the same. However, by now the Indian government is getting mistrustful of the Pakistani's. This leads to the following outcome.

		Pakistan	
		Status Quo	Attack
India	Status Quo	-1,-10	-2,-15
	Attack	0,-13	-1,-15

Figure 6: Model 1971 Pakistan Civil War with Indian Intervention

In the sixth round, Pakistan is in the middle of a civil war, when India sees the opportunity to intervene. Because Pakistan is dealing with the civil war with Bangladesh, its payoffs are always lower because then it will be fighting the war on two fronts. The Payoffs are higher for India, however, given the outcome of the previous round, coupled with the fact that the Pakistani's are preoccupied, hence, India chooses to attack. This leads to the liberation of Bangladesh and Pakistan trading concession for prisoners of war.

		Pakistan	
		No LoC	LoC
India	No LoC	-5,-3	-1,-1
	LoC	-5,-2	1,2

Figure 7: Model 1972 Simla Agreement

In the seventh round, we have the Simla Agreement occurring which eases tensions between the neighbors and thus raises the payoffs in each cell. Since India won the war, they agreed to give back Pakistani prisoners of war in exchange for an agreed Line of Control in the Kashmir region.

		Pakistan	
		Status Quo	Attack
India	Status Quo	0,0	-20,-5
	Attack	-10,-20	-20,-20

Figure 8: Model 1998 – Nuclear Tests Conducted

In the eighth round, we turn to 1998, where both India and Pakistan conduct nuclear tests. Note that the payoffs for attacking and being attacked have the lowest magnitude yet (accounting for the threat of a nuclear war). In addition, notice that the payoffs to Pakistan surprise attacking

India have not decreased by as large a magnitude. However, the equilibrium is still at SQ for both parties. This leads to the Lahore Declaration being signed as a response for India to protect itself against an attack by its neighbor.

		Pakistan	
		Status Quo	Attack
India	Status Quo	0,0	-20,5
	Attack	-10,-20	-20,-10

Figure 9: Model 1999 – Kargil Conflict

In the ninth round of the India-Pakistan game, we switch to 1999, after the Lahore Declaration has been signed. Notice how Pakistan’s payoffs have changed in response to the added security, the lower risk, surprise attack, etc. Now the equilibrium rests with a surprise attack by Pakistan in the Kargil district of Kashmir. India’s payoffs remain the same, even though they signed the declaration because, while they would feel safer, given the history of the two nations they would still feel the danger of Pakistan renegeing on the agreement. Hence, given the outcome, the Kargil conflict ensues.

		Pakistan	
		Status Quo	Attack
India	Status Quo	0,0	-20,-30
	Attack	-2,-10	-20,-30

Figure 10: Model 1999 – Kargil Conflict with US and China Intervention

In the final round of the game, we view the aftermath of Kargil. Equilibrium returns to SQ for India and Pakistan, once the US and China remove their backing for Pakistan. Notice Pakistan’s payoffs lowering by a large amount. This is due to the realization by Pakistan that it does not have allies with the superpowers anymore. Furthermore, it is militarily weaker than India, and would not use the nuclear weapons either (especially due to the close proximity of its enemy, and the alliance damage with China and the US). India’s payoff’s stay the same to reflect its disgust at the international system that turned its back on them. Finally, peace is achieved.

Using this approach, we have shown the ten relevant stages that Pakistan and India have gone through over the course of their short histories. The payoffs and equilibriums were calculated to present the outcomes of this particular case. The reasoning behind the sharp rise and drop of Pakistan's payoffs seem to be due to perceptions of its enemy and their reactions coupled with third party influence in the wars and negotiations. What we have hoped to display is the long history and mistrust of the two nations for each other, leading to each conflict being worse than the last. What this holds for the future we cannot say based on these abstractions, however it is safe to say that these conflicts cannot be allowed to continue, especially since they are both armed with nuclear weapons.

Organizational Theory

The organizational theory fits, in this case, because of the nature of the two governments. If we used the game-theoretical models from the above sections, we can see how the payoff structure changes over the course of the conflict, and really how the outcomes come about. However, since game theory is necessarily an abstraction of reality, it does not quite explain why the outcomes (outside of the payoff argument) come about. In this particular case, this is quite important, especially if we are setting off to find out why Pakistan attacked India in Kargil given that they had just signed an agreement and that they both possessed nuclear weapons. The magnitude of the payoffs provides some indication, but really, the attempt here is to use organization theory to fill in the gaps in the reasoning.

According to Kolb and Faure (1994), "organizations fit prominently into negotiations". Therefore, the differences (and similarities) between the organizations of Pakistan and India can provide some answers to the question above. The negotiated order is especially important given

the differences between the two. One major point that stands out is that most of the early negotiations between India and Pakistan were conducted between a military leader from Pakistan and a politician from India. In our view, this is perhaps the most important point because the cultures and norms of both involved nations are nearly identical. In the past 60 years of existence, Pakistan has spent more than half its life under one form of military dictatorship or another. General Ayub Khan (1958-69), General Yahya Khan (1969-71), General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-88), and now, General Pervez Musharraf (1999-current). India, on the other hand, has always been democratic. What this implies is that we have one nation that is authoritarian, while another that is democratic. Therefore, the culture, norms, and processes may be the same (both nations follow modified versions of the British Parliamentary system), but the structures are not. In the negotiation context, this is important because the wars (aside from the 1947 case) have come in periods of dictatorship or regime transition¹⁹. So have almost all the negotiated agreements. This indicates the volatility of Pakistan's policies. India, on the other hand, while not completely blameless, can be said to be free from this issue. These are clear indicators of autocracies being less accountable to their people, and thus have no real incentive to stick to what they say.

The other point to note here is the decision-making process is then necessarily different for the two nations. On the one hand, you have a military leader, who is also the head of state, and thus commands both departments and is answerable to no one. On the other hand, you have a democratically elected leader, answerable to both his party and his people (in theory). These two issues put together can help explain why Pakistan handled the Kargil situation the way it did. Now it may well be argued that at the time Kargil happened, we had a democratically elected leader in Pakistan (Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif). However, I would counter that by stating that

¹⁹ By regime transition, we mean switching from an autocracy to a democracy.

due to the over-exposure of Pakistan to military coups and the like, the structure of the government (even the democratic kind) are more authoritarian in nature.

Conclusion

This is an especially difficult case to get a breakthrough negotiation. The conflict has lasted for so long and the people on each side have become so embittered that making concessions is hardly an option, regardless of regime type. To add to the malady, there have been constant betrayals on both sides that make resolution even more difficult. This case draws an interesting parallel with the North Korea and US negotiations during the Korean War. The main difference here is that we are dealing with two nuclear states, and thus coercion by third parties is close to impossible. That being said, the main argument that we can see that may cause any sort of breakthrough is an economic one. India is emerging as a new superpower on the globe. Being in close proximity to it gives Pakistan a comparative economic advantage. Today, Pakistan is a staunch ally of China for the same reason, but one can see that the capabilities of China and India are different, and in order to obtain the most efficiency, Pakistan must remain on good terms with both nations. The main policy recommendation that we can make is to divide the state along the LoC, with each nation keeping the share it currently enjoys. As far as the river issue is concerned, Pakistan will continue to have a dependency with India, but if the situation remains status quo, that dependency will exist under any circumstance.

Supposing the conflict continues however, it is a very dangerous state of affairs. The power distribution in Pakistan is slowly shifting towards religious parties, though the military is usually in charge. There is little threat of a full-scale nuclear war, but even a little threat is too much. If the conflict continues though, Pakistan has more to lose in the end, as compared to

India. Thus, if there were any prediction to be made regarding this conflict, we would imagine a negotiated settlement along the LoC sometime in the future. We would imagine once India becomes more industrialized and moves away from agriculture, the settlement may be easier to achieve. The same holds true for Pakistan of course. The logic here is simple; if it becomes more costly to hold the partitioned state of Kashmir (costly in the economic and political sense), eventually it will all go to the nation that can bear the costs the longest. So far, it seems that India has the capability of holding out longer, so a negotiated settlement partitioning Kashmir along the current occupied ratio would be our recommendation to Pakistan. As far as India is concerned, given the threat of nuclear war and militant terrorism in the region, holding out may not be the best advice, but they can certainly bear it. Overall, however, it is in both nations interest to arrive at a settlement as early as possible so that the resource waste can be curbed and the threat of nuclear war can be eliminated.

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