

Customized Pricing

Outline

- ◆ **Examples**
- ◆ **Customized Price Optimization**
- ◆ **Bid Response Function**
- ◆ **Extensions**

Based on Phillips (2005) Chapter 11

Customized Pricing Examples

- ◆ **B2B:** Selling telecommunication (phone) service to companies
 - ◆ **Global** customers, annual spend more than \$10M
 - ◆ **Growth** customers, annual spend between \$10K and \$10M
 - ◆ **Metro** customers, annual spend less than \$10K
- ◆ **B2C:** Loans to individuals
 - ◆ With no collateral: Selling consumer loans
 - ◆ With collateral: Selling mortgage (home) loans
 - ◆ **Modifying mortgage** according to Peter Muriungi GMAC VP of Loan Servicing on Oct 8, 2009.
 - ◆ Consumers who fall behind monthly mortgage payments renegotiate payment terms with GMAC
 - ◆ GMAC reduces the principal, APR and/or extends payment period to give some relief to the consumers
 - ◆ Mortgage modifications depend on consumer characteristics
 - ◆ Jumbo loans vs. others; Loan/House value; Underwater borrowers; Disposable income; Fixed expenses; Family size
 - ◆ GMAC wants to estimate who will fall behind before they do to be proactive in negotiations; consumers should ask for modification before they fall behind
- ◆ **C2C:** Selling a house without a realtor to an individual.

Customized Price Optimization

- ◆ We are selling goods and receive a request for proposal (RFP) or a request for quote (RFQ) to sell d items, how should we price each item? How to bid?
- ◆ Recall total (deal) contribution to margin at price p : $m(p) = (p - c)d(p)$.
- ◆ Bid response function: Probability of winning the bid at price p : $\rho(p)$.
- ◆ Maximize the expected contribution to find the optimal customized price p :

Customized Pricing:

$$\max_p \{ (p - c) d \rho(p) \}$$

- ◆ Recall the optimization problem of basic pricing with market size D and the proportion $1 - W(p)$ of the consumer who are willing to pay more than price p .

Basic Pricing:

$$\max_p \{ (p - c) D (1 - W(p)) \}$$

- ◆ **No new optimization methodology is needed.** The customized pricing is structurally the same as the basic pricing problem.
- ◆ Analogy: Probability versus Proportion.
 - ◆ Bid response function $\rho(p)$ at price p .
 - ◆ Price response function $1 - W(p)$ at price p .
- ◆ Despite different interpretations, mathematically they are the same.



Uncertainty of Bid Response Function

◆ Uncertainty in bid response

- ◆ Generally buyers pick
 - ◆ Objective: Lowest cost (optimization)
 - ◆ Constraints: Among qualified offers (satisfaction).
- ◆ Preference uncertainty: Uncertainty of criteria (objective) used by the buyer.
 - ◆ Preference can be based on cost, quality, delivery time, or a combination thereof.
 - ◆ Cowboy's stadium constructor needs two steel arcs. High strength low-alloy steel (A913 steel) arcs for retractable roof, the longest single-span roof in the world.
 - ◆ **Dimensions:** Each arch spans about 300 meters, reaches 90 meter maximum height and weighs about 3255 tons.
 - ◆ **Quality:** The steel must be strong to carry the roof, indoor TV; It must be flexible enough so that it can be bent to make an arch; Its chemical composition should allow for welding.
 - ◆ **Delivery time:** They should be delivered in 6 months to avoid construction delays.
- ◆ Competitive uncertainty: Uncertainty of constraints and other qualified offers.
 - ◆ Constraints can also be based on cost, quality, delivery time, or a combination thereof.
 - ◆ **Softer** constraints: Each arc spans **about** 300 meters and reaches **about** 90 meters.
 - ◆ Competitors: ArcelorMittal headquartered in Luxembourg; Henan Shinxiang Industry from AliBaba.com.
 - ◆ Qualification and number of competitors are not known.
- ◆ A buyer has less uncertainty than bidders. A buyer can benefit from the bidder's uncertainty.

Bid Response Function with a Single Competitor


- ◆ Write the bid response $\rho(\cdot)$ as a function of the single competitor's price. This price of our competitor is not known to us but we know its cumulative distribution F .
- ◆ $F(p)$: the chances that the single competitor will bid p or less.
 - 50% chance for a bid of at most \$3 (from 0 to 3).
 - 80% chance for a bid of at most \$4 (from 0 to 4).
 - 99% chance for a bid of at most \$8.
 - 100% chance for a bid of infinite dollars, so $1=F(\text{infinity})$.
- ◆ Then $1-F(p)$ is the chance that the competitor will bid at least p and perhaps more.
 - 50% chance for a bid of at least \$3.
 - 20% chance for a bid of at least \$4.
 - 1% chance for a bid of at least \$8.
- ◆ Example: If we charge \$4, what is the chance of winning the bid?
 - 20% as the competitor bids more than \$4.




A customer buys from us if
 [competitor's price $\geq p$]
 Or with probability $\rho(p)=1-F(p)$.

Example: Triangle Distribution for Competitor's Price

Drawn to scale.




A triangle of this size




corresponds to 3.125%. There are 32 of this size triangles in 100%.

Example: Triangle Distribution for Competitor's Price



Example: Logit Bid Response Function



- ◆ Logit bid response function has the same form as the logit price response function.
- ◆ Techniques used in estimating the logit price response function apply to the estimation of the logit bid response function.
 - ◆ But the parameterization in chapter 3 of the textbook is slightly different, recall

$$1 - W(p) = 1 - \frac{1}{1 + e^{-(a+bp)}}$$

where the parameters are multiplied by negatives.

In general, W of Chapter 3 can be interpreted as F here to replicate the examples therein.

Bid Response Function with Multiple Competitors

- ◆ Write the bid response $\rho(\cdot)$ as a function of N competitor's price. These prices of our competitors are not known to us but we know their cumulative distribution F_n for competitor n .
- ◆ $F_n(p)$: the chances that competitor n will bid p or less.
- ◆ $1-F_n(p)$ is the chance that competitor n will bid at least p and perhaps more.
- ◆ We sell if we bid p and less than all of the competitors:
- ◆ A customer buys from us if [minimum competitor's price $\geq p$]
- ◆ Example: If we charge \$4 while each of the two competitors is independently expected to charge more than \$4 with 20%, what is our chance of winning the bid?
 - $4\% = 20\% \times 20\%$.

A customer buys from us if [price of competitor $n \geq p$] for competitor n , $1 \leq n \leq N$.

Or with probability $\rho(p) = (1-F_1(p)) (1-F_2(p)) \dots (1-F_N(p))$.

Extensions

- ◆ Pricing to increase market share: $\rho(p) \geq$ threshold.
- ◆ Pricing to increase contribution to margin: $p \geq$ threshold.
- ◆ Pricing contracts: Contracts are over a duration for the purchase of goods/services. They are often based on aggregate quantities (total dollar spent rather than individual products bought). Uncertainty in level (total demand) and mix (individual demands) play important roles.
- ◆ Bundling:
 - ◆ Price the bundled product
 - ◆ Price the items in the bundle but sell the bundle as a whole; not preferred by sellers
 - ◆ Price and sell the items separately
- ◆ Fulfillment: Dual sourcing – understand your customer
 - ◆ OPRE 6366: Supply Chain Management Sourcing Module
 - ◆ OPRE 6371: Purchasing and Sourcing Management

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