A Crash Course In Compiler Certification

Language-based Security

September 28, 2015

A Famous Compiler Attack

• Ken Thompson’s 1984 Turing Award Speech
  – awarded (in part) for inventing B language
  – “Reflections on Trusting Trust”
  – described an experimental “compiler Trojan”

• Compiler Trojan Attack
  – compiler modified to embed a Trojan horse in all compiled object code
  – compiler then recompiled
  – Result: Trojan horse no longer visible in ANY source code, yet infects all binaries!
A Modern Compiler Trojan

Apple scrambles after 40 malicious “XcodeGhost” apps haunt App Store
Outbreak may have caused hundreds of millions of people to download malicious apps.

by Dan Goodin - Sep 21, 2015 9:40am CDT
Anatomy of a Compiler
Example: GCC

FRONT END
- C Parser
- C++ Parser
- Java Parser
- VB Parser
- F95 Parser

MIDDLE “END”
- GENERIC
- GIMPLE
- GIMPLE - SSA
- Various Optimizations

BACK END
- RTL
  - x86
  - PowerPC
  - x64
What is “Compiler Correctness”? 

• Each source language has a well-defined semantics (we hope)
  – Large-step: $<c,\sigma> \downarrow \sigma'$
  – Small-step: $<c,\sigma> \rightarrow <c',\sigma'>$
  – Denotational: $C[[c]]\sigma = \sigma'$

• Each object language has a well-defined binary semantics
  – See the Intel x86 architecture manual, for example

• High-level idea: Semantic Transparency
  – Correct compilers preserve program behavior.
  – Equivalently: Each compiler stage is semantically transparent.

• Problem:
  – What is “equivalent behavior”? 
  – Different domain models for source vs. object language!
Labeled Transition Systems

• Project out “observable” events

\[ <c, \sigma> \xrightarrow{\tau} <c', \sigma'> \]

• Correct compilers preserve sequences of observable events (traces)

• Still many challenges:
  – What about non-determinism?
  – What about (unsafe) source languages for which some operations are “undefined”?
  – What about operations that admit several different “correct” behaviors?
Case Study: Register Allocation

• Map program variables (actually intermediate language pseudo-registers) to machine registers
  – Use registers as much as possible (fast)
  – Avoid memory storage (slow)

• Example:

Inputs: b, c, d
a := c + d
e := a + b
f := e − 1
Outputs: f

Inputs: r_1, r_2, r_3
r_2 := r_2 + r_3
r_1 := r_2 + r_1
r_1 := r_1 − 1
Outputs: r_1
Algorithm for Register Allocation

- Famous result due to Chaitin (IBM, 1980)
  - **Liveness:** $x$ is *live* if it contains a value that is later used in at least one ensuing control-flow path
  - **Interference:** $x$ and $y$ *interfere* if they are ever both live
  - **Interference Graph:**
    - nodes are variables
    - edges between variables that interfere
  - register allocation = $k$-coloring problem!
    - $k = \#$ machine registers = \# colors
    - color all nodes with no edge having endpoints of same color
Step 1: Compute Liveness

• Construct control-flow graph
• Working backwards along edge CFG edge...
  – remove assigned variables from live-set
  – then add read variables to live-set
• Iterate along CFG until a fixed point is reached
  – Question: How do we know this process eventually terminates?
\[ a := b + c \]
\[ d := -a \]
\[ e := d + f \]
\[ f := 2 \times e \]
\[ b := d + e \]
\[ e := e - 1 \]
\[ b := f + c \]
\[ \text{return } b \]
Step 2: Construct Interference Graph

- Graph with one node per variable
- Insert edges between variables that appear together in any live-set
a := b+c

\{a, c, f\}

d := -a

\{c, d, f\}

e := d+f

\{c, e\}

f := 2*e

\{c, f\}

b := f+c

\{b, c, f\}

\{b\}

return b

\{}b\{}

\{{b, c, f}\}

\{c, f\} {b, c, e, f}

\{c, d, e, f\} {c, e} {c, d, e, f}

\{c, d, f\}

\{a, c, f\}

\{b, c, f\}
Step 3: Color Nodes

• Find a k-coloring of the nodes
  – no edge’s endpoints may have same color
  – # of colors (k) = # of machine registers
• k-coloring is NP-complete
  – no known algorithm better than brute search
  – very good heuristic algorithms though
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How to Prove Correctness of a Register Allocator?

• Correctness:
  – Result is a register mapping $R$ satisfying $\text{val}(v) = \text{val}(R(v))$ for all possible traces

• Proof approach #1:
  – Prove that all 3 steps always yield such an $R$
  – Proving the k-coloring part is hard because the heuristics can be quite complex

• Proof approach #2:
  – Add a small validator to the compiler that double-checks the $R$ for correctness.
  – Prove that the validator is correct.
  – Much easier (k-coloring is NP, so $R$ is easier to check than to produce!)
One Drawback of Validator Approach

• Proving validator correct does NOT prove that the algorithm whose output it checks is always correct!
  – If algorithm is wrong, validator catches error and stops.
  – Compilation fails with error.
• Why is this okay?
  – From a security perspective, our primary concern is preventing compiler from *silently generating* *incorrect* code.
  – Failing with an error has less severe consequences.
  – Can be addressed with unit testing, quality assurance processes, etc.
Next Week

• Machine Code Validation
  – How can we formally prove things about raw machine code programs?